Fordham Law Review
Volume 89

Issue 4

Article 19

2020

Chief Justice Roberts's Hard Look Review
Nikol Oydanich
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Nikol Oydanich, Chief Justice Roberts's Hard Look Review, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 1635 (2021).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol89/iss4/19

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S HARD LOOK
REVIEW
Nikol Oydanich*
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. announced a
framework for judicial review of agency actions that are challenged as
arbitrary and capricious. The decision, however, left two significant
questions unresolved: How much political influence in agency decisionmaking is too much to fail judicial review? And may a reviewing court
scrutinize the agency’s substantive policy choice or not? This Note argues
that Department of Commerce v. New York and Department of Homeland
Security v. Regents of the University of California—the Court’s most recent
applications of State Farm—settle these questions.
This Note argues that Chief Justice Roberts’s answer to the question of
how much political influence is “too much” under State Farm is that this is
the wrong question to be asking. An agency’s “unstated reasons” for
acting—such as political influences, motivations, presidential agendas, and
the like—are excluded from the State Farm analysis. The only question for a
court reviewing an agency decision pursuant to State Farm is whether the
agency sufficiently engaged in reasoned decision-making.
Next, this Note maintains that Chief Justice Roberts’s answer to the
question of whether judicial review pursuant to State Farm permits scrutiny
of an agency’s substantive policy decision is a firm no, because it is the
agency, and not the reviewing court, that must engage in substantive
decision-making. The focus of judicial review pursuant to State Farm is not
the substance of an agency’s decision but the reason-giving process that led
the agency to its substantive decision.
Putting these two arguments together, this Note argues that the application
of State Farm in Department of Commerce and Regents—referred to as Chief
Justice Roberts’s “hard look review”—makes clear that it is an agency’s
reasons for acting and its reasoning process that sit at the center of the
Court’s review under State Farm.
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INTRODUCTION
“Do you get the impression the Supreme Court doesn’t like me?”1
President Donald Trump tweeted this question shortly after the U.S. Supreme
Court published its decision in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents
of the University of California,2 in which it rejected the rescission of the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program by the secretary
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).3 The Supreme Court
split 5-4 in concluding that the secretary’s rescission of DACA was arbitrary
and capricious, in violation of § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure
Act4 (APA), because DHS failed to comply “with the procedural requirement
that it provide a reasoned explanation for its action.”5 Chief Justice Roberts
penned the majority opinion and subsequently faced several attacks from
Republican lawmakers: Representative Jim Jordan of Ohio stated that Chief
1. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 18, 2020, 11:10 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1273634152433188865
[https://perma.cc/
7SYW-T6JW].
2. 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
3. See id. at 1912; see also Mark Moore, Trump Suggests Supreme Court ‘Doesn’t Like’
Him After DACA Ruling, N.Y. POST (June 18, 2020, 12:23 PM), https://nypost.com/
2020/06/18/trump-says-supreme-court-doesnt-like-him-after-daca-ruling [https://perma.cc/
WU3M-7C8W].
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706.
5. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1916.
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Justice Roberts was “convoluting the law to appease the DC establishment,”
and Senator Ted Cruz of Texas criticized the decision as “lawless.”6
Conservative figures similarly lambasted the Chief Justice for his majority
opinion in Department of Commerce v. New York,7 accusing him of acting
like a politician8 and “betray[ing] the US Constitution.”9 In that decision,
Chief Justice Roberts determined that the secretary of the U.S. Department
of Commerce’s attempt to reinstate a citizenship question in the 2020 Census
was not arbitrary or capricious10 but rejected the action as pretextual, holding
that the reason proffered for the change was contrived.11
Are these critiques of the Chief Justice warranted? Can one fairly read
these two decisions as stretching the law or applying an unlawful standard of
review? Answering these questions requires an understanding of the legal
standard agencies must meet to survive arbitrary and capricious judicial
review—a standard the Supreme Court has historically left hazy.12
In both Department of Commerce and Regents, the Supreme Court
reviewed the arbitrary and capricious challenges pursuant to the framework
laid out in its 1983 opinion, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.13 Cited in over 700 D.C. Circuit
opinions, State Farm remains the seminal case on arbitrary and capricious
review.14 The State Farm Court is considered to have “reaffirmed the
judiciary’s central role in ensuring regularity with the core administrative
value of reasoned decision-making”15 by embracing “hard look review” for
arbitrary and capricious challenges to agency action.16
State Farm, however, as a split decision, showed how reasonable minds
can disagree on what constitutes reasoned decision-making,17 and legal
6. Devan Cole & Jamie Ehrlich, GOP Lawmakers Tear into John Roberts Over DACA
Ruling, CNN (June 18, 2020, 6:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/18/politics/republicancriticism-john-roberts-daca-supreme-court/index.html [https://perma.cc/TR3N-LZ5J].
7. 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
8. See Josh Gerstein, Conservatives Blast Roberts as Turncoat, POLITICO (June 27, 2019,
8:54 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/27/conservatives-blast-roberts-1386124
[https://perma.cc/M32Q-A3TY].
9. Sebastian Gorka (@SebGorka), TWITTER (June 27, 2019, 2:28 PM),
https://twitter.com/SebGorka/status/1144311489941135360 [https://perma.cc/ZRZ3-ERYA].
10. See Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2571.
11. See id. at 2575.
12. See, e.g., Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84
WASH. L. REV. 419, 428 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court has “left the doctrine for
reviewing agency rulemaking in shambles”).
13. 463 U.S. 29 (1983); see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
140 S. Ct. 1891, 1912–13 (2020); Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2569.
14. See Michael A. Livermore & Daniel Richardson, Administrative Law in an Era of
Partisan Volatility, 69 EMORY L.J. 1, 34 n.149 (2019).
15. Id. at 35.
16. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 772 (2008) (“State Farm was widely taken to have ratified the hard look
doctrine.”).
17. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Arbitrariness Review Made
Reasonable: Structural and Conceptual Reform of the “Hard Look,” 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
331, 348 (2016).
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scholars have since debated what State Farm’s hard look review actually
requires of agencies.18 This Note focuses on two of the debates raised in
State Farm.
First, scholars and courts have grappled with determining the permissible
extent of political influence in agency decision-making, beyond which
agency action would fail State Farm’s arbitrary and capricious judicial
review.19 The second highly debated question is whether hard look review
penalizes an agency for substantive and procedural defects in its decisionmaking or whether State Farm requires courts to scrutinize only procedural
defects. This Note argues that the recent decisions in Department of
Commerce and Regents settle these two issues regarding hard look review
that State Farm left unresolved. Specifically, Department of Commerce and
Regents show that political influence is permissible in agency decisionmaking—albeit irrelevant to the reviewing court’s analysis under State
Farm—and that State Farm exclusively scrutinizes an agency’s reasongiving process but not the substance of its policy decision.
Part I explains the origins of the reasoned decision-making requirement
and explores its development in the formative cases of State Farm,
Department of Commerce, and Regents. Part II discusses how legal scholars
have treated, and attempted to make sense of, the two aforementioned issues
in State Farm. Having considered the relevant background and leading
academic commentary, Part III offers an answer to these unresolved
questions by arguing that Department of Commerce and Regents show: (1)
an agency decision will survive arbitrary and capricious review when, even
if motivated by politics, it was the product of reasoned decision-making; and
(2) hard look review is a procedural tool used to ensure that agencies
adequately discuss and justify their actions, rather than a substantive analysis.
I. THE GENESIS OF THE REASONED DECISION-MAKING REQUIREMENT
A long-standing principle of administrative law is that the APA, for
purposes of regulating agency behavior, requires agencies to engage in
“reasoned decisionmaking.”20 The phrase “reasoned decisionmaking,”
however, does not appear in the APA, and the Supreme Court did not use the
phrase prior to decisions from its 1982 term21—specifically, Baltimore Gas
& Electric Co. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.22 and State
18. See infra Part II.
19. See Barry Sullivan & Christine Kexel Chabot, The Science of Administrative Change,
52 CONN. L. REV. 1, 66 (2020) (noting that subsequent Supreme Court decisions applying State
Farm have failed to resolve the tension between expertise and deference to political influence
that divided the Justices).
20. See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)
(stating that the APA establishes a scheme of reasoned agency decision-making that courts
enforce to ensure regulations are “supported by the reasons that the agencies adduce”); John
F. Duffy, Reasoned Decisionmaking vs. Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 2351, 2352 (2019).
21. See Duffy, supra note 20, at 2360.
22. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
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Farm.23 Nonetheless, the idea that an agency must justify its actions existed
at the Supreme Court prior to the Court’s use of the phrase and in
administrative law even prior to the APA’s enactment.24
A. Judicial Review Pre–State Farm
Indeed, in a 1947 decision, the Supreme Court held that when “dealing
with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is
authorized to make, [the Court] must judge the propriety of such action solely
by the grounds invoked by the agency.”25 In SEC v. Chenery Corp.26
(Chenery II), the Court affirmed the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
denial of a holding company’s reorganization plan—a decision the Court
originally rejected a few years prior—on grounds that now the commission
had thoroughly expressed the reasons for its decision.27 The Court found that
the agency’s decision was “the product of administrative experience,
appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the statutory
policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts.”28
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chenery II is couched in the fundamental
principle of administrative law that, unlike Congress, agencies must
articulate reasons for their policymaking.29 By focusing judicial review on
how an agency has justified its action, the Chenery II decision made explicit
reason-giving a significant part of agency policymaking.30
Some legal scholars have traced the roots of reasoned decision-making to
before the 1947 Chenery II decision—specifically, to President Woodrow
Wilson’s late nineteenth-century vision of the administrative state.31
President Wilson envisioned an administrative state comprised of a
“technically schooled civil service”32 with the “best minds,”33 “removed

23. 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 420 (1971)
(stating that courts must engage in “a thorough, probing, in-depth review” and that “since the
[administrative] record may not disclose the factors that were considered . . . it may be
necessary for the District Court to require some explanation . . . to determine . . . if the
Secretary’s action was justifiable”); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
156, 167 (1962) (“There are no findings and no analysis here to justify the choice made, no
indication of the basis on which the Commission exercised its expert discretion.”).
25. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
26. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
27. See id. at 199.
28. Id. at 209.
29. See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952,
955–56 (2007) (“At its core, the Chenery principle directs judicial scrutiny toward what the
agency has said on behalf of its action, not simply toward the permissibility or rationality of
its ultimate decision . . . .”).
30. Id. at 957.
31. See Shannon Roesler, Agency Reasons at the Intersection of Expertise and
Presidential Preferences, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 491, 501–02 (2019); Kathryn A. Watts,
Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 33 &
n.138 (2009).
32. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 216 (1887).
33. Id. at 221.
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from the hurry and strife of politics.”34 His view of agencies as apolitical,
expert institutions that could best address societal problems justified the
explosive growth of the administrative state during the New Deal.35 Then
contemporary luminaries believed that agency expertise alone warranted
Congress’s broad delegations of power to agencies.36
Other scholars have argued that reasoned decision-making is not a legacy
of President Wilson’s expertise model but is better traced to the interest group
model of the administrative state, which became an accepted justification for
agency rulemaking by the early 1970s.37 The interest group model emerged
following the New Deal, due to increasing skepticism that expertise was not
all that guided agency decision-making.38 That agencies made value
judgments in the course of exercising their broad directives from Congress
grew apparent as groups that regularly sustained the costs of an agency’s
rulemakings organized to have their interests represented.39 Rather than
being apolitical experts, agencies were increasingly seen as entities prone to
“capture” by the industries they regulated, raising concerns of political
accountability to those outside the regulated industry who were inevitably
affected by agency actions.40 Courts responded to the threat of capture by
creating a more aggressive standard of judicial review of agency action—one
that “force[d] agencies to engage in technocratic decisionmaking open to
participation by varying interest groups”—by imposing a burden of
explanation on the agency when it adopted or amended a rule.41
Although § 706(2)(A) of the APA already instructed federal courts to
invalidate agency decisions that were “arbitrary” or “capricious,”42 various
judges on the D.C. Circuit in the 1960s and 1970s ramped up this judicial
review to require that an agency survive a “hard look.”43 The hard look
doctrine requires agencies to offer “encyclopedic[] explanations for their
conclusions, to respond to counterarguments, to justify departures from past
practices, and to give careful consideration to alternatives to the proposed

34. Id. at 209.
35. Roesler, supra note 31, at 502.
36. See Sullivan & Chabot, supra note 19, at 9; see also Watts, supra note 31, at 33–34
(stating that through the New Deal, “agencies derived their legitimacy from the notion that
they were made up of professional and capable government ‘experts’ pursuing the ‘public
interest’”).
37. Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 148–49, 153 (2012).
38. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1761 (2007).
39. See Roesler, supra note 31, at 502; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 154
(“Agency staff members often share the professional background of the employees of the
companies they regulate and . . . interact closely with their industry compatriots on a day-today basis.”).
40. See Roesler, supra note 31, at 502–03, 502 n.49.
41. Watts, supra note 31, at 34; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 155 (“The doctrinal
details of the reasoned decision-making standard respond to the cautionary message of the
interest group model.”).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
43. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 761.
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course of action.”44 The reasoned decision-making requirement of hard look
review was intended to serve as a source of legitimacy for an agency’s action
and to ensure that the agency was a responsible agent of Congress, faithfully
exercising its granted discretion.45 In State Farm, the Supreme Court signed
on to the idea that arbitrary and capricious review requires courts to take a
“hard look” at agency action.46
B. State Farm’s Hard Look Review
Seen as the moment when the Court endorsed the reasoned decisionmaking requirement,47 the State Farm decision has since been criticized as
providing limited guidance to lower courts on how to apply what has become
a controversial standard of review.48 At issue in State Farm was whether the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) rescission of
Modified Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 was arbitrary and capricious.49
This rule required manufacturers to equip vehicles produced after September
1982 with airbags or automatic seat belts.50
Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 196651 to
“reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from
traffic accidents.”52 The Act directed the secretary of the U.S. Department
of Transportation to issue—after considering “relevant available motor
vehicle safety data”—vehicle safety standards that were “reasonable,
practicable and appropriate” and “me[t] the need for motor vehicle safety.”53
As initially promulgated in 1967, Safety Standard 208 required the
installation of seat belts in all passenger cars.54 Employing these seat belts,
also known as “active belt systems,” required passengers to manually secure
the lap and shoulder belts.55 NHTSA later found that although “highly
effective” when worn, the “low usage rate of active seat belt systems
negate[d] much of their potential safety benefit.”56 Thus, in July 1969, the
agency invited public comment on a revised safety standard mandating
passive-restraint systems in passenger cars.57 Unlike active belt systems—
44. Id.
45. See Sullivan & Chabot, supra note 19, at 31 & n.207.
46. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 771–72.
47. Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 154.
48. Keller, supra note 12, at 438.
49. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 38 (1983).
50. Id.
51. Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718, repealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 745, 1379.
52. Id.
53. Id. § 103(a), (f)(3), 80 Stat. 718 at 719.
54. See Initial Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2415 (Feb. 3,
1967) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. pt. 255).
55. See Occupant Restraint Systems, 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289, 34,290 (July 5, 1977) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
56. Id. at 34,289–90.
57. See Inflatable Occupant Restraint Systems, 34 Fed. Reg. 11,148, 11,148 (proposed
July 2, 1969).
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which depend on manual buckling to provide safety—passive restraints
deliver crash protection without requiring passengers to take any action
because they deploy automatically upon entry or collision.58
In 1977, after repeated revisions to Safety Standard 20859 and a subsequent
suspension of the regulation due to widespread public opposition,60 President
Jimmy Carter’s secretary of transportation issued Modified Standard 208, a
new “automatic passive restraints” regulation that obliged auto
manufacturers to equip passenger cars with either airbags or passive seat
belts.61 NHTSA estimated that these precautions would prevent over 9000
deaths and 65,000 injuries annually.62
In April 1981, however, President Ronald Reagan’s secretary of
transportation proposed a rescission of Modified Standard 208 due to the
“economic difficulties of the automobile industry.”63 In October 1981,
NHTSA promulgated a final rule rescinding the requirement that auto
manufacturers install either airbags or passive seat belts.64 The agency
explained that it could no longer determine whether the passive restraint
requirements would provide more than “minimal safety benefits,”65 and thus,
imposing the substantial costs of the requirements on the public would be
unreasonable.66 It was this decision to rescind that insurance companies
challenged for being arbitrary and capricious.67
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded in State Farm that NHTSA’s
rescission of the passive restraint requirement was arbitrary and capricious
because NHTSA’s explanation failed to convince the Court that the
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., Occupant Crash Protection, 37 Fed. Reg. 3911, 3911 (Feb. 24, 1972) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (noting that the passive-restraint requirement would be effective
in August 1975); Occupant Crash Protection in Passenger Cars, Multipurpose Passenger
Vehicles, Trucks, and Buses, 35 Fed. Reg. 16,927, 16,927 (Nov. 3, 1970) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 571).
60. See Ernest Holsendolph, Coleman Puts off Air‐Bag Ruling; Proposes a Limited
Voluntary Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/12/07/
archives/coleman-puts-off-airbag-ruling-proposes-a-limited-voluntary-plan.html
[https://perma.cc/Z9SH-52EN] (stating that President Gerald Ford’s secretary of
transportation was concerned the passive restraints “would be badly received by the driving
public”).
61. Occupant Restraint Systems, 42 Fed. Reg. at 34,289–90.
62. See id. at 34,298.
63. Occupant Crash Protection, 46 Fed. Reg. 21,205, 21,206 (Apr. 9, 1981) (to be codified
at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
64. See Occupant Crash Protection, 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419, 53,419 (Oct. 29, 1981) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
65. Id. at 53,424. If Modified Standard 208 were to go into effect, NHTSA stated that
“the assumed life-saving potential of air bags would not have been realized” because
manufacturers “planned to install them in less than 1 percent of new cars,” and “the
overwhelming majority of new cars would be equipped with automatic belts that are
detachable,” which “might only approach [usage] levels similar to those currently achieved
with manual belts.” Id. at 53,421–22.
66. Id. at 53,420, 53,423 (“Vehicle price increases would have amounted to approximately
$1 billion per year.”).
67. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 39 (1983).
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rescission “was the product of reasoned decisionmaking.”68 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court framed arbitrary and capricious review in “expertdriven terms”69: an agency’s decision would be arbitrary if the agency
“relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence . . . or is so implausible that
it could not be . . . the product of agency expertise.”70
The Court stated further that the “scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and
capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency” but requires the agency to “examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a ‘rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”71 Notably, the
Court, referencing Chenery II, reiterated that if a reviewing court identifies
deficiencies in an agency’s explanation, it “may not supply a reasoned basis
for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”72
When applying this standard to NHTSA’s rescission of Modified Standard
208, all nine Justices agreed that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously
because it failed to consider whether to modify the regulation to impose an
airbags-only requirement.73 Given NHTSA’s earlier determination that
“airbags are an effective and cost-beneficial lifesaving technology,” the
Court referred to an airbags-only requirement as “the logical response.”74
The Justices split 5-4, however, on whether—in light of auto manufacturers’
plans to largely install detachable automatic belts75—NHTSA’s decision to
rescind the safety standard as to the passive seat belts was also arbitrary and
capricious.76
Justice Byron White, writing for the majority, recognized that “[e]xpert
discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process” and determined that
the agency failed to “bring its expertise to bear on the question.”77 The
majority found no evidence to support NHTSA’s conclusion that detachable
automatic belts would yield usage levels similar to those currently achieved
with manual belts78 and provided that NHTSA “failed to articulate a basis for
not requiring nondetachable belts.”79
Conversely, Justice William Rehnquist, in dissent, determined that
NHTSA’s “explanation, while by no means a model, [was] adequate”
because it articulated a rational basis for its conclusion—namely that the
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
part).
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 52.
Watts, supra note 31, at 7.
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
Id. (citing Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
Id. at 46.
Id. at 48, 51.
See supra note 65.
See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57–58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
Id. at 48, 54 (majority opinion).
Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 55.
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small increase in seat belt usage would not be worth the cost of requiring
detachable automatic belts.80 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged
that NHTSA’s decision to rescind Modified Standard 208 “seem[ed] to be
related to the election of a new President of a different political party” but
nonetheless argued that, “[a]s long as the agency remains within the bounds
established by Congress,” a “change in administration . . . is a perfectly
reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of” its regulations.81
State Farm’s split decision became the seminal case on arbitrary and
capricious review.82 Apart from establishing the standard of review for
future § 706(2)(A) challenges, State Farm also foreshadowed how the
Supreme Court would resolve these actions—in lengthy opinions featuring
some disputing Justices. The next section discusses two recent Supreme
Court cases applying State Farm, both of which echo the 1983 decision and
notably display even more contentiousness among the Justices.
C. State Farm in Recent Supreme Court Cases
1. Department of Commerce v. New York
In March 2018, President Trump’s secretary of commerce, Wilbur Ross,
announced his decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020
Census.83 This decision was an exercise of the authority delegated by
Congress to the secretary to “take a decennial census . . . in such form and
content as he may determine.”84
Secretary Ross stated that changing the census to include a citizenship
question would provide improved citizen voting-age population data, which
would then be used by the U.S. Department of Justice to better enforce the
Voting Rights Act of 196585 (VRA) and its ban on minority vote dilution.86
Secretary Ross explained in a memorandum that, in his judgment, reinstating
a citizenship question on the Census, while also enhancing the U.S. Census
Bureau’s administrative records, would provide the most accurate citizen
voting-age population data in comparison to other available alternatives.87

80. Id. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also supra notes
65–66 and accompanying text.
81. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59.
82. See Livermore & Richardson, supra note 14, at 34 n.149.
83. Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, Sec’y of Com., to Karen Dunn Kelley, Under Sec’y
for Econ. Affs., on Reinstatement of a Citizenship Question on the 2020 Decennial Census
Questionnaire (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2018-0326_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6XY-84WZ].
84. 13 U.S.C. § 141(a).
85. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52
U.S.C.).
86. See Ross, supra note 83, at 2.
87. Id. at 4–5 (explaining that posing the citizenship question to the entire population
provides each respondent an opportunity to answer and may eliminate the need for the Census
Bureau to have to impute an answer for millions of people).
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Secretary Ross said that he considered the argument that reinstatement of
the citizenship question would depress the response rate.88 But, because the
Census Bureau failed to present definitive evidence showing how
responsiveness would be impacted, Secretary Ross ultimately determined
that more complete and accurate data from surveying the entire population
outweighed the responsiveness concern.89 Secretary Ross’s decision was
challenged in federal district court on grounds that, inter alia, the decision
violated the APA.90
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, held that Secretary Ross’s
decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious because he appropriately
examined the Census Bureau’s alternatives for collecting improved data,
weighed the risks and benefits of each, and explained why reinstating the
citizenship question presented the best course.91 Because the Secretary—not
the Census Bureau— is authorized by statute to choose “between reasonable
policy alternatives in the face of uncertainty” and because the secretary’s
decision was “reasonably explained,” the Court concluded that the
reinstatement decision was not arbitrary or capricious.92
The majority opinion strongly critiqued Justice Breyer’s dissent,93 which
argued that the secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously because he failed
to defer to the Census Bureau’s expertise.94 The majority rejected Justice
Breyer’s acclaim of agency expertise by stating that “policymaking is not a
‘rarified technocratic process, unaffected by political considerations’” and
that a court may not set aside an agency’s policy solely because it might have
been prompted by a president’s agenda.95 By second-guessing the
secretary’s reasonable exercise of discretion and requiring the secretary to
defer to the Census Bureau’s position, Chief Justice Roberts maintained that
Justice Breyer was substituting his judgment for that of the agency—a longstanding violation of State Farm.96
Although Secretary Ross’s decision survived arbitrary and capricious
review, the Court set it aside because the sole reason proffered for reinstating
the citizenship question—to better enforce the VRA—seemed “contrived.”97
Chief Justice Roberts based this conclusion on the fact that the record failed
to show the secretary considered VRA enforcement when deciding to

88. Id. at 5.
89. Id.
90. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2019).
91. Id. at 2570.
92. Id. at 2570–71.
93. Id. at 2571.
94. Id. at 2590, 2593 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. Id. at 2573 (majority opinion) (quoting Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)).
96. Id. at 2571 (“It is not for us to ask whether his decision was ‘the best one possible’ or
even whether it was ‘better than the alternatives.’” (quoting F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Power Supply
Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016))).
97. Id. at 2575 (stating that the secretary’s decision was “unlike a typical case in which an
agency may have both stated and unstated reasons for a decision”).
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reinstate the citizenship question, although he began this project early in his
tenure.98
In rejecting the secretary’s decision, the Chief Justice established that a
“court may not reject an agency’s stated reasons for acting simply because
the agency might also have had other unstated reasons.”99 But where, as
here, the explanation for the secretary’s decision is “incongruent with what
the record reveals,” Chief Justice Roberts maintained that Secretary Ross
violated the reasoned decision-making requirement and that the decision
could not stand on such a disingenuous rationale.100
Commentators considered Department of Commerce to be a surprising
result for reasons ranging from the Court’s use of pretext to its decision to
leave undetermined whether a citizenship question would appear on the 2020
Census.101 However, this would not be the last time the Court “decided an
important case without deciding the questions that make it so important.”102
The Court’s opinion in Regents, decided one year later and discussed in the
next section, was especially similar to Department of Commerce in this
respect.103
2. Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California
On June 15, 2012, President Barack Obama’s secretary of DHS announced
DACA, an immigration relief program.104 DACA allows undocumented
persons who entered the United States as children and have continuously
resided here since 2007 to apply for a two-year forbearance of removal,
subject to renewal.105 DACA also made its recipients eligible for work
authorization and other federal benefits, including Social Security and
Medicare, during the period of deferred action.106
On September 4, 2017, President Trump’s attorney general, Jeff Sessions,
sent a letter to Acting DHS Secretary Elaine Duke, advising her to rescind
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2573.
100. Id. at 2575–76.
101. See Nicholas Bronni, Census Symposium: Unusual Facts Make for Unusual
Decisions, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2019, 11:51 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2019/06/census-symposium-unusual-facts-make-for-unusual-decisions
[https://perma.cc/
K4PC-VG76].
102. Nicholas Bronni, Symposium: DACA Déjà Vu, SCOTUSBLOG (June 19, 2020, 3:17
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposium-daca-deja-vu [https://perma.cc/
ZTM4-DUAF].
103. See id.
104. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., for David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S.
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, on
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
States as Children (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercisingprosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
7UGS-8ZCK].
105. Id. at 2–3.
106. Id. at 3; see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.422(h) (2020); 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(4)(vi) (2021).
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DACA.107 Attorney General Sessions warned that the DACA program
shared the “same legal and constitutional defects” the Fifth Circuit and
Supreme Court had recognized in the Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program and thus, was
likely unlawful.108 Among other defects, the Fifth Circuit found that the
Immigration and Nationality Act109 foreclosed DAPA’s conferment of
eligibility for federal and state benefits.110 Secretary Duke rescinded the
DACA memorandum the following day, citing the attorney general’s letter
and the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit rulings as the bases for her
decision.111 Multiple plaintiffs challenged the rescission as arbitrary and
capricious, in violation of § 706(2)(A).112
Chief Justice Roberts, writing again for the majority, set aside DACA’s
rescission after finding that it violated State Farm.113 Notably, the Chief
Justice reaffirmed that arbitrary and capricious review under State Farm
requires the Court to be unconcerned with the wisdom of DACA or its
rescission.114 Rather, the Court is to address only whether the secretary
“complied with the procedural requirement that it provide a reasoned
explanation for its action.”115
Chief Justice Roberts held that Secretary Duke’s justification for DACA’s
rescission involved the same error as NHTSA’s rescission of Modified
Standard 208 in State Farm, which required consideration of an airbags-only
requirement.116 State Farm established that for an agency’s rescission of its
prior policy to survive arbitrary and capricious review, the agency’s reasoned
analysis must consider the “‘alternative[s]’ that are ‘within the ambit of the
existing [policy].’”117 Chief Justice Roberts stated that, with respect to
DACA, retaining the program’s forbearance benefit was not just “within the
ambit of the existing [policy]” but was its “centerpiece.”118 Consequently,
the secretary’s rescission of DACA required a reasoned explanation as to
107. See Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen., to Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y,
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/
994651/download [https://perma.cc/574A-S93Q].
108. Id.
109. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 and 22 U.S.C.).
110. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 181 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
111. Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. et al. (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca
[https://perma.cc/
XT7P-475C].
112. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1903
(2020).
113. Id. at 1912.
114. Id. at 1916.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 1912.
117. Id. at 1913 (alteration in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S.,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983)).
118. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983)).
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why retaining the forbearance component of the policy, while eliminating
benefits eligibility—an option within the secretary’s discretion—was
inappropriate.119 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that Secretary Duke’s
failure to consider whether to retain DACA’s forbearance component and to
provide an explanation for its termination constituted arbitrary and capricious
agency action.120
In dissent, Justice Thomas criticized Chief Justice Roberts’s reliance on
State Farm, arguing that the ruling was inapplicable because, in his view,
DACA is an unlawful policy and has been since its inception.121 Because
State Farm only establishes what an agency must do to rescind a lawful
policy, Justice Thomas argued that the Court lacked authority to even
scrutinize DHS’s reasons for rescinding DACA, noting that the rescission of
an unlawful program is plainly reasonable.122
Regents, decided nearly forty years after State Farm, and a similarly split
decision, shows how the Supreme Court continues to divide over what the
standard of review for § 706(2)(A) challenges actually entails. State Farm
raised many questions that subsequent decisions have left unanswered, two
of which this Note discusses in the next part.123
II. WHAT STATE FARM LEFT UNRESOLVED
First, tension remains between Justice White’s emphasis on reasoned
decision-making and Justice Rehnquist’s deference to a new president’s
political agenda.124 Although hard look review always requires that reasoned
decision-making and expertise guide an agency’s actions, the Justices
continue to disagree on how much political influence is too much.125 Second,
the Supreme Court in State Farm did not clarify whether the agency’s action
was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to explain its decision not to
adopt the “the logical response,” or because it failed to adopt “the logical

119. Id. at 1912.
120. Id. at 1913. The Chief Justice also found DACA’s rescission violated State Farm
because the secretary failed to consider and adequately explain the reliance interests of the
program’s beneficiaries weighed against competing policy concerns. Id. at 1914.
121. Id. at 1919 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
122. Id. at 1919, 1930.
123. See Sullivan & Chabot, supra note 19, at 9.
124. Id.; see also Note, Judicial Review of Informal Administrative Rulemaking, 1984
DUKE L.J. 347, 375 (“Should the courts defer to agency decisions ‘encouraged’ by changes in
administration? The dissenters in State Farm would be more likely to accept such politically
motivated decisions.”).
125. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009) (disagreeing
with Justice Breyer’s position that courts should be more vigilant of political influences when
reviewing policy decisions from independent agencies); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing
“Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1141 (2010) (“In
general, courts have not offered clear guidance on whether political reasons, if offered, can
serve as an adequate basis for an agency’s decision.”); see also The Supreme Court, 2018
Term–Leading Cases, 133 HARV. L. REV. 372, 377 (2019) (“[A]gencies cannot take actions
that are excessively politically driven, and it can be difficult for courts to figure out which
types of political judgments are acceptable and which are arbitrary and capricious.”).
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response.”126 Accordingly, ambiguity remains as to whether courts applying
hard look review should vacate an agency’s action for its procedural defects
only or for its substantive ones as well.127
A. Balancing Political Influence and Expertise
Following Department of Commerce, some have characterized Chief
Justice Roberts’s and Justice Breyer’s positions as evidencing a tension
between political influence and expertise that is reminiscent of Justice
Rehnquist’s and Justice White’s opinions in State Farm.128 Understanding
this analogy requires a review of how commentators have interpreted the
Rehnquist-White debate to determine the proper balance between political
influence and expertise permitted by State Farm.
Commentators widely read State Farm—specifically the debate between
Justices White and Rehnquist—as the Supreme Court’s condemnation of
political considerations in agency decision-making.129 To support this
reading of State Farm, these commentators rely on the fact that only Justice
Rehnquist’s partial dissent conveyed the position that political influences can
reasonably motivate an agency’s rulemaking (assuming, of course, that the
agency also respects the statutory boundaries set by Congress), whereas the
majority opinion stood for the requirement that agencies justify their
decisions in technocratic, expert-driven terms.130
Others, however, criticize this reading of State Farm as an exaggerated
interpretation of Justice White’s opinion, noting that the majority neither
addressed Justice Rehnquist’s endorsement of political influence as a
legitimate basis for reappraising agency policy, nor considered the political
context of NHTSA’s decision beyond mentioning that changes in
administration had occurred.131 These commentators posit that Justice
White’s silence should not be taken as a rejection of political influence; that

126. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48 (“[T]he logical response to the faults of detachable
seatbelts would be to require the installation of airbags. At the very least this alternative way
of achieving the objectives of the Act should have been addressed and adequate reasons given
for its abandonment.”).
127. Compare Miles & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 771 (“[T]he Court endorsed both
procedural and substantive aspects of the hard look doctrine.”), with Watts, supra note 31, at
16 (stating that courts “scrutinize the substantive elements of agency decisions” when
applying hard look review).
128. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 36–37 (explaining how Chief Justice Roberts evidenced a “desire to reaffirm the
importance of judicial deference to the policy choices of agencies’ political leadership,”
whereas Justice Breyer “tied deference for discretionary agency decisions closely to
expertise”).
129. See Watts, supra note 31, at 19 (“[T]he opinion has been widely read over time to
represent the triumph of expertise to the exclusion of politics.”).
130. Id. at 6 (“Ever since the Court handed down State Farm, agencies, courts, and scholars
alike generally seem to have accepted the view that influences coming from one political
branch or another cannot be allowed to explain administrative decisionmaking, even if such
factors are influencing agency decisionmaking.”).
131. See Mendelson, supra note 125, at 1138.
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silence is better explained by the fact that NHTSA did not justify the rule’s
rescission by referencing the change in administration.132
Legal scholars who conclude that State Farm does not prohibit politics
from influencing an agency’s decision-making debate the precise role of
politics envisioned by the 1983 Supreme Court. Nina Mendelson,133 Kathryn
Watts,134 and now Justice Kagan135 advocate for greater transparency
regarding political influence in an agency’s rulemaking. Watts, for example,
argues had NHTSA openly disclosed that President Reagan’s deregulatory
position influenced its decision to rescind the passive seat belt requirement,
the agency should have satisfied the Court with an adequate explanation
sufficient to survive arbitrary and capricious review.136 Similarly, Justice
Kagan praised Justice Rehnquist for recognizing the role that President
Reagan’s election played in NHTSA’s decision-making and for easing the
demand for expertise in NHTSA’s justification accordingly.137 Justice
Kagan argued that although the change in administration could not relieve
NHTSA of considering obvious regulatory alternatives, it was sufficient to
justify NHTSA’s value judgment between reasonable policy choices.138
In response, Mark Seidenfeld argues that other legal scholars’ calls for
greater transparency about political influence rest on a misguided reading of
State Farm.139 Seidenfeld maintains that hard look review does not prohibit
an agency from engaging in “politically motivated” rulemaking but rather
prevents an agency from using political considerations to justify its
actions.140 Whether politics have influenced an agency’s decision is
irrelevant to the reviewing court’s inquiry under State Farm because,
irrespective of political influence, an agency cannot survive arbitrary and
capricious judicial review141 if it fails to justify its decision pursuant to the
132. Id. at 1138–39; Watts, supra note 31, at 19.
133. See Mendelson, supra note 125, at 1130 (proposing that agencies be required to
disclose executive influence on their decisions to increase accountability and deter overreach).
134. See Watts, supra note 31, at 8 (arguing that courts engaging in arbitrary and capricious
review should consider political influences that are disclosed in an agency’s rulemaking record
as legitimate justifications for the agency’s action).
135. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2381–82
(2001) (arguing that when presidential policy justifies an agency’s action, it should be publicly
disclosed “to receive judicial credit”).
136. Watts, supra note 31, at 72, 77 (proposing that the State Farm opinion could be read
as “penalizing” NHTSA because the rescission seems to be based on “secret political
influences”).
137. See Kagan, supra note 135, at 2380–81 (suggesting a revised approach to hard look
review that would relax a reviewing court’s scrutiny “when demonstrable evidence shows that
the President has taken an active role in” the decision).
138. Id. at 2381.
139. Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 144–45 (“Watts and her fellow critics of hard-look
review are correct that courts have not credited citations to political influence in evaluating
whether agency rulemaking meets the hard-look standard. But, . . . this does not reflect any
hostility within the standard to such influence.”).
140. Id. at 150 (“A policy that is motivated by the president’s desire to provide benefits to
his political supporters may nonetheless be defensible as good policy.”).
141. Id. at 163–64 (providing the example that, had NHTSA rescinded Modified Standard
208 to protect the autonomy of car owners to buy the cars that they prefer, the Supreme Court
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factors Congress authorized it to consider when making policy.142
Seidenfeld argues that because the judiciary is least accountable to the polity,
a reviewing court has “no business”143 penalizing an agency for an “unstated
rationale” in its decision-making if the stated justification is within
Congress’s permissible bounds—provided that the agency’s proffered
explanation is not so implausible that it is pretextual.144 This position,
Seidenfeld asserts, is consistent with State Farm’s hard look review because
it ensures transparency in agency decision-making by evaluating its stated
justifications but allows an agency to make value judgments that Congress
authorized it to make without judicial constraint, by keeping an agency’s
unstated reasons out of the court’s review.145
Following the Chief Justice’s opinion in Department of Commerce, more
commentators have framed the unresolved tension between expertise and
political influence in State Farm as an issue of how a reviewing court should
consider an agency’s unstated reasons for its policy. Jennifer Nou, for
example, argues that although the majority in Department of Commerce set
aside the secretary’s decision on pretextual grounds, administrative law has
always tolerated some pretext.146 To support this argument, Nou relies on
Chief Justice Roberts’s assertions in Department of Commerce that agency
decisions may appropriately rest on both “stated and unstated reasons” and
that a court may not set aside an agency action only because unstated political
considerations influenced the agency’s decision-making process.147 The
“new principle” introduced in Department of Commerce, Nou argues, is that
arbitrary and capricious review under State Farm rejects “wholly implausible
rationale[s]”—in other words, an agency’s explanation must at least be
supported in the administrative record to avoid being set aside as
pretextual.148
In contrast, some commentators have bolstered Justice Thomas’s
argument in dissent regarding the unprecedented nature of the Court’s

likely would have held the rescission was arbitrary and capricious because car owner
autonomy is not a factor that NHTSA’s authorizing statute allowed it to consider).
142. In State Farm, the factors the Court looked for in NHTSA’s explanation of its decision
included, inter alia, whether NHTSA established, based on “relevant available motor vehicle
safety data,” that Modified Standard 208 was no longer “reasonable, practicable and
appropriate” and would not “meet the need for motor vehicle safety.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 436 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1983) (quoting
National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 103(f)(1), (3)–(4), 80
Stat. 718, 719, repealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 745,
1379).
143. Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 159.
144. See id. at 162.
145. Id.
146. Jennifer Nou, Census Symposium: A Place for Pretext in Administrative Law?,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2019, 12:54 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/censussymposium-a-place-for-pretext-in-administrative-law [https://perma.cc/RTU8-WBPR]; see
also Watts, supra note 31, at 40 (arguing that agencies undergoing arbitrariness review “dress
up their decisions . . . to hide political influences”).
147. Nou, supra note 146.
148. Id.
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invalidation on pretext grounds.149 Louis Murray, for example, criticizes the
Court for reading a prohibition on pretext into § 706 of the APA.150 Murray
argues that because the APA lacks a “sincerity requirement,” an agency
should survive arbitrary and capricious review as long as it offers a
reasonable justification and even if it masks the true motivation behind its
action.151 Samuel Estreicher also rejects Chief Justice Roberts’s invalidation
on pretext grounds because he argues that it disqualifies Secretary Ross—
who is deemed the decision maker by Congress on this issue—from making
an otherwise legally justified decision.152
Gillian Metzger defends Chief Justice Roberts’s pretext analysis on the
ground that, although courts do not usually speak in terms of pretext, State
Farm made a prohibition on pretextual decision-making a part of arbitrary
and capricious review.153 Metzger explains that the Supreme Court rejected
NHTSA’s justification for rescinding Modified Standard 208—that the
measure would not achieve its predicted safety benefits—because NHTSA
did not adequately consider obvious alternatives that would promote
safety.154 In doing so, the Supreme Court implied that safety was not actually
motivating NHTSA’s decision-making.155 Thus, State Farm rejects
pretextual justifications without labeling them as such.156 An advantage of
including pretext as part of arbitrary and capricious review, Metzger argues,
is that it allows courts to avoid delineating what extent of political influence
is legitimate in agency decision-making.157
Evidently, the White-Rehnquist debate between reasoned decision-making
and deference to a president’s political agenda continues; the question of how
a reviewing court should consider political influence on agency decisionmaking when engaging in State Farm’s hard look review remains
unresolved. The next section discusses another ambiguity in State Farm:
whether courts applying hard look review should vacate an agency’s action
for its procedural defects only or for its substantive ones as well.
B. The Logical Response: A Failure to Discuss or a Failure to Adopt?
Whether State Farm penalizes an agency for failing to discuss other
regulatory alternatives or failing to adopt those alternatives is rooted in the
149. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576, 2579 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that under settled principles of
administrative law, a reviewing court is never to inquire into pretext).
150. See Louis Murray, Note, Reconceptualizing Pretext’s Role in Administrative Law, 57
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 481, 487–88 (2020).
151. Id. at 483, 493.
152. See Samuel Estreicher, “Pretext” and Review of Executive Decisionmaking in the
Citizenship Census Question Case, JUSTIA (July 9, 2019), https://verdict.justia.com/2019/07/
09/pretext-and-review-of-executive-decisionmaking-in-the-citizenship-census-question-case
[https://perma.cc/RA4X-XM82].
153. See Metzger, supra note 128, at 33–34.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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broader question of whether a reviewing court is to scrutinize the agency’s
decision-making process only or the substance of its ultimate decision as
well.
Commentators have argued that State Farm’s hard look review solely
scrutinizes an agency’s reasoning process, noting that the Court there
rejected NHTSA’s rescission of Modified Standard 208 because the agency
failed to consider alternatives and thus engaged in a flawed decision-making
process.158 Jacob Gersen and Adrian Vermeule approach this issue with
evidence that, between 1983 and 2016, the Court reached the merits on sixtyfour arbitrariness challenges but held an agency’s decision was arbitrary and
capricious only 13 percent of the time.159 In showing that surviving hard
look review is “hardly a heroic task,” Gersen and Vermeule imply that the
Court does not use State Farm to set aside an agency’s decision “simply
because the court is unhappy with the result reached”—i.e., for failing to
adopt an alternative policy.160
Others are not so certain that process is all that is in play.161 Now Attorney
General Merrick Garland, who served as counsel for State Farm Automobile
Insurance Company in State Farm, argues that the decision presents a “quasiprocedural” standard for judicial review.162 The standard is “quasiprocedural” because it imposes substantive requirements for the agency’s
decision-making record but leaves the method for producing the record up to
the agency.163 Garland finds support for this position in Justice White’s
majority opinion, in which the Court stated that an agency must supply a
reasoned analysis to justify its decision.164 The Court found NHTSA failed
to do so because it rescinded the entire passive-restraint rule without
explaining its reasons for rejecting, or even considering, an airbags-only
requirement—“the logical response.”165
Garland also argues that although Justice White’s opinion is couched in
“quasi-procedural rhetoric,” to read State Farm as identifying no substantive
component to hard look review is incorrect.166 The Court’s substantive
review is evidenced by its charge that the agency failed to explain why it did
not impose a nondetachable seat belt requirement, when, as Garland argues,
158. Patrick Garry, The Values and Viewpoints Affecting Judicial Review of Agency
Actions: A Focus on the Hard-Look Doctrine, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 71, 73 (2014); see also
Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 155 (arguing that State Farm’s hard look review “is essentially
process based” because outcomes need not “meet any particular substantive standard” but
must only be justified by “addressing factors . . . relevant to its decision”).
159. Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355,
1362 (2016) (noting that it would have been “only 8 percent of the time if we confine ourselves
to pure arbitrariness cases”).
160. Id. at 1360, 1362.
161. See Keller, supra note 12, at 452 (arguing that “State Farm opened the door for courts
to scrutinize the substantive policy decisions made by agencies”).
162. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 507,
543 (1985).
163. Id. at 530.
164. Id. at 543.
165. Id. at 543–44.
166. Id. at 545.
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Justice Rehnquist’s dissent showed that NHTSA proffered a detailed
explanation on this issue.167 Because NHTSA “could have ‘considered’ and
‘explained’ until it was hoarse, yet still not have changed the Court’s ultimate
conclusion,” Garland maintains that the Court penalized NHTSA both for
failing to consider (process) and for failing to adopt (substance), the logical
response.168
Another way of analyzing the difference between process and substance
with respect to State Farm’s hard look review is to consider whether the
agency, on remand, can revise the defect that led the reviewing court to deem
the action arbitrary and capricious. Garland argues that if the defect is a
failure to consider or adequately explain a regulatory alternative, then it is
procedural, and the agency may improve its decision-making process on
remand by better explaining itself.169 Once corrected, the agency may adopt
the same policy as originally planned, and a court must uphold it.170 If,
however, the defect is a failure to adopt a specific policy, then the issue is
substantive, and a court will preclude the agency from readopting the same
policy on remand.171 Thus, the only solution available to an agency on
remand for a substantive defect is to adopt a different policy.172
This question between process and substance seemed to be top of mind
during oral argument in Regents. Justice Kavanaugh, for example, asked
whether DACA’s rescission would “still fall short” if “it were detailed more
fully” on remand.173 Justice Gorsuch proposed that if the secretary’s error is
a failure to adequately explain the rescission, “What more is left to be
said?”174 Similarly, Justice Breyer asked whether there was any purpose to
remanding when the secretary would “come out the same way,” noting that
prior Justices have urged courts to refrain from “playing ping pong with the
agency” if there is nothing to gain on remand.175
Some have described Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to remand to DHS
for further explanation as being one of process, noting that the Court took
issue with the secretary’s decision-making process but not the outcome.176
167. See id. at 546 (“By any measure, the agency’s explanation was not only detailed, but
seemingly rational.”).
168. Id. at 548–49.
169. Id. at 570.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Transcript of Oral Argument at 86, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (No. 18-587).
174. Id. at 58.
175. Id. at 82.
176. See Peter Margulies, The DACA Case: Agencies’ “Square Corners” and Reliance
Interests in Immigration Law, 2019–2020 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 127, 128 (arguing that Chief
Justice Roberts’s review “is deliberative, not substantive” because he “conceded that DHS had
the power to end DACA”); Cristian Farias, How Trumpian Incompetence Led to Chief Justice
Roberts’s DACA Ruling, VANITY FAIR (June 18, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/
2020/06/how-trumpian-incompetence-led-to-chief-justice-robertss-daca-ruling
[https://perma.cc/D8CQ-FCNB] (“Did Sessions and Trump’s then acting secretary . . . dot all
their is and crossed [sic] all their ts in rolling back the program?”).
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Others criticize the majority for simply delaying the final resolution of
DACA, as its opinion tells DHS “to go back and try again.”177 Others
question whether Chief Justice Roberts would have found a memo that
addresses reliance interests and says they do not outweigh the policy interests
in rescinding DACA to also be “procedurally defective.”178 If this is so—if
any explanation offered by DHS would fail to satisfy the Court—it would
support Garland’s view that NHTSA could have only changed the Court’s
ultimate conclusion in State Farm by adopting a substantively different
policy.179
In sum, nearly forty years after State Farm, judges, litigators, and law
students continue to debate whether State Farm’s hard look review is
procedural or substantive. The same is true for the question of how a
reviewing court should consider political influence in agency decisionmaking when faced with a § 706(2)(A) challenge.180
As the next part explains, Chief Justice Roberts’s decisions in Department
of Commerce and Regents suggest clarifications of these two issues in State
Farm. Specifically, Part III argues Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look review
(1) provides that an agency will survive arbitrary and capricious review when
its decision, even if motivated by politics, was the product of reasoned
decision-making; and (2) serves as a procedural tool to ensure that agencies
adequately discuss and justify their actions, rather than a substantive analysis.
III. HOW DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND REGENTS CLARIFY STATE FARM
State Farm has long been criticized for presenting a muddled standard that
lower courts struggle to apply and for politicizing judicial review.181
Because the Supreme Court has failed to provide a precise definition of what
constitutes reasoned decision-making, some argue that State Farm invites
judges to vary their scrutiny of an agency’s explanation according to their
political attitudes and ideologies, making judicial review unpredictable and
riddled with disagreement.182 For example, Gillian Metzger maintains that
the majority in Department of Commerce, when invoking State Farm,
“dial[ed] down [its] scrutiny” of the secretary’s decision-making, whereas
the dissent “dial[ed] it up.”183 Others maintain that State Farm’s hard look

177. Bronni, supra note 102.
178. Christopher J. Walker, What the DACA Rescission Case Means for Administrative
Law: A New Frontier for Chenery I’s Ordinary Remand Rule, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE &
COMMENT (June 19, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/what-the-daca-rescission-casemeans-for-administrative-law-a-new-frontier-for-chenery-is-ordinary-remand-rule
[https://perma.cc/3DC8-38LJ].
179. See Garland, supra note 162, at 548–49.
180. See supra Part II.A.
181. See Keller, supra note 12, at 459.
182. See Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 17, at 354–55.
183. Metzger, supra note 128, at 35; see also Christopher J. Walker, What the Census Case
Means for Administrative Law: Harder Look Review?, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE &
COMMENT (June 27, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/what-the-census-case-means-foradministrative-law-harder-look-review [https://perma.cc/8TD2-ZNYT] (referring to Chief
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review is a significant cause of ossification of administrative policymaking
and recommend relaxing or eliminating the standard altogether.184
Despite these alleged weaknesses, State Farm’s hard look review is
recognized as an essential tool for legitimatizing agency actions because it
serves as a significant counterbalance to Congress’s broad delegations of
power to agencies.185 It cannot be overstated—and Department of
Commerce and Regents adequately show—that decisions made by agencies
can have profound consequences. Had the secretary of commerce
successfully added the citizenship question to the 2020 Census, the predicted
lower response rate would have “affect[ed] how hundreds of billions of
dollars in federal spending [were] distributed.”186 Similarly, had DHS
lawfully rescinded DACA, 700,000 young adults would have lost their
protection from deportation.187
Because people may organize their lives around such policy decisions,
administrative law principles like the reasoned decision-making requirement
and State Farm’s hard look review are intended to protect the public from
unreasonable, irrational, poorly justified, and narrowly considered policy
changes.188 Expecting courts to adequately apply a muddled doctrine to
decisions of such great significance is like playing Russian roulette: the
method is irrational, the injury can be catastrophic, and the outcome is
inherently unpredictable.189 This part explores how Department of
Commerce and Regents have clarified State Farm’s hard look review so that
its future application will be more reasonable and obvious and less arbitrary
and capricious.

Justice Roberts’s analysis in Department of Commerce as “more searching than State Farm’s
‘hard look’ review”).
184. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 135, at 2380.
185. See William W. Buzbee, Agency Statutory Abnegation in the Deregulatory Playbook,
68 DUKE L.J. 1509, 1580 (2019) (arguing that, because State Farm establishes that an agency
action will “rise and fall based on the justification provided,” courts fulfilling their reviewing
functions ensure that agencies act in accordance with their enabling statutes).
186. Adam Liptak, On Census Citizenship Question, Supreme Court’s Conservatives
Appear United, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/us/
politics/supreme-court-census-citizenship.html [https://perma.cc/MQH9-TB3M].
187. See Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Trump Can’t Immediately End DACA,
Supreme Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
06/18/us/trump-daca-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/73QM-2QGJ].
188. See Stephen Lee, Opinion, DACA and the Limits of Good Governance, REGUL. REV.
(July 29, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/07/29/lee-daca-good-governance/
[https://perma.cc/2ZC8-GLC3] (arguing that arbitrary and capricious judicial review allows
courts to “curb[] the worst of the federal government’s tendencies” but that doing so in Regents
did not offer a permanent solution for undocumented persons).
189. See Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part) (stating that courts have “beefed-up arbitrary-andcapricious” review “so much so that, on occasion, the courts’ arbitrary-and-capricious review
itself appears arbitrary and capricious”).
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A. Justice Rehnquist v. Justice White—Who Won?
Review of Chief Justice Roberts’s Department of Commerce opinion
evidences a close alignment with Justice Rehnquist in State Farm. First, both
Justices explicitly acknowledge the role a president’s political agenda plays
in agency policymaking. Just as Justice Rehnquist stated that “a change in
administration . . . is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s
reappraisal of” its regulations,190 so too did Chief Justice Roberts insist that
“a court may not set aside an agency’s policymaking decision solely because
it might have been . . . prompted by an Administration’s priorities.”191
Second, while both Justices show a commitment to enforcing the reasoned
decision-making requirement, their as-applied interpretation of what
constitutes reasoned decision-making appears more relaxed than that of
others on the Court. Indeed, NHTSA’s explanation for rescinding Modified
Standard 208 as to the passive seat belt requirement adequately satisfied
Justice Rehnquist, even though he determined it was “by no means a
model.”192 Justice White, however, felt NHTSA “failed to articulate a basis
for not requiring nondetachable belts.”193 Similarly, because the Census
Bureau failed to present definitive evidence showing how responsiveness
would be impacted, Secretary Ross’s inclusion of the citizenship question
despite concerns of resulting inaccuracies convinced Chief Justice Roberts
that the secretary adequately explained himself, even if the decision was not
“the best one possible.”194 The same explanation, however, failed to
persuade Justice Breyer that Secretary Ross engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.195
Metzger argues that in reaching the conclusion that Secretary Ross’s action
was not arbitrary and capricious, Chief Justice Roberts reaffirmed the
importance of judicial deference to the “choices of an agency’s political
leaders.”196 This argument is similar to Justice Kagan’s interpretation of
Justice Rehnquist’s State Farm dissent as exhibiting a relaxation in the
demand for NHTSA’s expertise, due to an acknowledgment that President
Reagan’s election to office influenced NHTSA’s decision-making.197
Metzger’s position would be persuasive if Chief Justice Roberts’s opinions
only echoed Justice Rehnquist’s political deference in State Farm. A close
reading of Chief Justice Roberts in Regents, however, also reveals traces of
Justice White’s emphasis on reasoned decision-making.
190. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019).
192. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193. Id. at 55 (majority opinion).
194. Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2570–71.
195. Id. at 2590 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that even if
not definitive, the Census Bureau’s evidence showed a likely drop in response accuracy and
that State Farm requires the secretary to explain why he included the question without
searching for more conclusive evidence).
196. See Metzger, supra note 128, at 36.
197. See Kagan, supra note 135, at 2381–82.
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First, Chief Justice Roberts recognized the error in Secretary Duke’s
decision-making process as the same error Justice White identified in
NHTSA’s reasoning.198 NHTSA’s determination that, given the prevalence
of automatic seat belts, Modified Standard 208 would provide minimal safety
benefits did “not cast doubt” on the life-saving efficacy of airbags.199
Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts held the Fifth Circuit’s determination that
DAPA’s benefits component was unlawful did not cast doubt on the legality
of DACA’s forbearance component.200 This analogy became central to Chief
Justice Roberts’s conclusion that DACA’s rescission without the secretary’s
consideration of a forbearance-only program was arbitrary and capricious:
just as the Supreme Court in 1983 held NHTSA could not completely
abandon the passive-restraint regulation without explaining why an airbagsonly requirement was an insufficient alternative,201 so too, Chief Justice
Roberts argued, the Court could not permit DHS to rescind DACA in full
without consideration of a forbearance-only program.202
Second, echoing Justice White’s finding that NHTSA failed to “bring its
expertise to bear on the question,”203 Chief Justice Roberts found it
problematic that Secretary Duke relied on the attorney general’s conclusion
as to the illegality of DACA’s conferment of benefits to rescind the entire
program—without explaining the rescission as to forbearance.204
Recognizing that Congress delegated authority for establishing national
immigration policy to the DHS secretary alone and that a forbearance-only
option was within the secretary’s discretion, Chief Justice Roberts concluded
that failure to consider this important aspect of DACA’s rescission meant
that Secretary Duke failed to do her job.205 That is, DACA’s rescission
required Secretary Duke to bring DHS’s expertise to bear on the issue, but
implementing the attorney general’s advice without a complete explanation
failed to satisfy State Farm and flouted Congress’s delegation to DHS.206
Finally, just like Justice White in State Farm,207 Chief Justice Roberts did
not consider whether and to what extent political influence played a role in
Secretary Duke’s decision, beyond mentioning DACA’s genesis in the
Obama administration and its attack under the Trump administration.208 At

198. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1912–
13 (2020) (“While the factual setting is different here, the error is the same.”).
199. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 47 (1983)).
200. Id.
201. See State Farm Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983).
202. See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1913 (“That omission alone renders Acting Secretary
Duke’s decision arbitrary and capricious.”).
203. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 54.
204. See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912.
205. Id. at 1912–14.
206. Id.
207. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. But see supra note 81 and
accompanying text.
208. See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1903.
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most, both Justices identified the respective changes in administration, but
that was all the explicit airtime given to politics.
Finding that Department of Commerce resonates more with Justice
Rehnquist and Regents with Justice White seems to thicken the age-old State
Farm smog: that the standard is unpredictable and invites judges to vary
their scrutiny of an agency’s explanation depending on whether they approve
of the agency’s policy choice.209 This position, however, overlooks key
factual differences between Secretary Ross’s action in Department of
Commerce and Secretary Duke’s in Regents, which logically lead to opposite
outcomes when reviewing pursuant to State Farm.
Even when Chief Justice Roberts endorsed a role for political influence in
agency decision-making in Department of Commerce,210 his finding that
Secretary Ross’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious exclusively turned
on the explanation the secretary provided for including the citizenship
question on the Census.211 Whatever “unstated reasons” Secretary Ross may
have had for changing the Census were beyond Chief Justice Roberts’s
review—even if it is safe to assume that satisfying President Trump’s
political agenda constituted one of those reasons.212 What mattered to the
Chief Justice was that the secretary considered alternatives to the citizenship
question, discussed the costs and benefits of each, and explained that, in light
of the Census Bureau’s uncertainty as to how the citizenship question would
affect the response rate, the benefits of having more complete data from
surveying the entire population outweighed the potential cost of decreased
responsiveness.213 In other words, Secretary Ross did not “entirely fail[] to
consider an important aspect of the problem.”214
Conversely, when Chief Justice Roberts made no mention of political
influence in Regents—aside for the implications that come with a change in
administration—his finding that Secretary Duke’s decision was arbitrary and
capricious depended solely on the lack of explanation provided for rescinding
all of DACA.215 Indeed, the Chief Justice did not even consider, for example,
whether President Trump’s agenda motivated the decision to rescind DACA,
although there is little popular doubt that it did.216 All that mattered was that
Secretary Duke “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem.”217
The commonality, then, is clear: Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look review
is only concerned with the sufficiency of the agency’s proffered explanation
209. See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 190–91.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 91–92.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 94–95.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 86–92.
214. See supra text accompanying note 70; see also Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.
Ct. 2551, 2571 (2019) (“The Secretary was required to consider the evidence and give reasons
for his chosen course of action. He did so.”).
215. See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
216. See Farias, supra note 176.
217. See supra text accompanying note 70; see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020).
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of its action, looking to see that the agency has done its job in considering
important aspects of the problem before it. As for an agency’s “unstated
reasons” for acting—such as political influences, motivations, and agendas—
these are excluded from the Court’s analysis.218 Thus, Chief Justice
Roberts’s answer to the question of how much political influence is too much
under State Farm is that this is the wrong question for courts to be asking.
The only inquiry for a court engaging in arbitrary and capricious review
pursuant to State Farm is whether the agency considered important aspects
of the problem and explained its choice among competing alternatives.
Chief Justice Roberts’s rejection of Secretary Ross’s decision to include
the citizenship question on pretext grounds further supports this conception
of State Farm.219 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that Secretary Ross’s
decision was not arbitrary or capricious before he began the inquiry into
Thus, unlike Professor Metzger’s
whether it was pretextual.220
suggestion,221 the pretext analysis is separate from the Court’s review under
State Farm. This separation supports the conclusion that hard look review
only scrutinizes the sufficiency of the agency’s explanation for its decision
and is unconcerned with its political motivations.222 Secretary Ross stated
that the goal in adding the citizenship question to the Census was to
ultimately better enforce the VRA.223 Chief Justice Roberts, however, only
analyzed this VRA enforcement rationale when engaging in the pretext
analysis and excluded it from the Court’s application of State Farm.224 Chief
Justice Roberts’s State Farm analysis may seem to have left out one of the
secretary’s “stated reasons,” but this is not the case.
Secretary Ross hoped to improve VRA enforcement225—this was his
motive for engaging in the policy change. But, Chief Justice Roberts showed
that State Farm is unconcerned with motive.226 The focus of Chief Justice
Roberts’s arbitrary and capricious review in Department of Commerce was
the secretary’s justification for choosing the citizenship question as his
course of action.227 Chief Justice Roberts confined his application of State
Farm to scrutiny of the secretary’s conclusion that including the citizenship
question would accomplish the stated goal of VRA enforcement, but Roberts
did not discuss whether enhanced VRA enforcement was a wise policy
218. See Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 150 (arguing that whether politics have influenced
an agency’s decision is irrelevant to the reviewing court’s inquiry under State Farm); supra
notes 139–45 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
220. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019) (“We now consider the
District Court’s determination that the Secretary’s decision must be set aside because it rested
on a pretextual basis.”).
221. See Metzger, supra note 128, at 33–34 (discussing the benefits of “approaching pretext
as part of a general arbitrary and capriciousness review”).
222. See Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 150.
223. See Ross, supra note 83, at 2.
224. See Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2573–76.
225. See Ross, supra note 83, at 2.
226. See Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 150.
227. See Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2569–71.
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objective.228 In doing so, the Chief Justice affirmed that State Farm aims to
ensure that an agency’s final action “was the product of reasoned
decisionmaking” and that its policy decision to pursue a particular course of
action is justified in light of alternatives and supported by evidence.229
Scrutiny of the agency’s motivation for its policy change is simply beyond
the Court’s analysis.
The fact that the Court’s prohibition on pretext is absent from its arbitrary
and capricious review does not then mean that the Court read a “sincerity
requirement” into § 706 of the APA.230 Rather, the prohibition on pretext is
baked into administrative law as a principal holding of Chenery II—that a
reviewing court must judge the propriety of an agency’s “action solely by the
grounds invoked by the agency.”231 Finding that the proffered motivation to
improve VRA enforcement was “contrived,”232 the Court could not fulfill its
Chenery II duty because the genuine “grounds invoked by the agency”
remained undisclosed by Secretary Ross.233
So, whom did Chief Justice Roberts select as the winner? This question is
not entirely appropriate because it assumes that Justices White and Rehnquist
stood in stark opposition to each other in State Farm. In reality, the two
Justices agreed on much, and Chief Justice Roberts echoes both.234
What can be said with more certainty, however, is that Chief Justice
Roberts put to rest the widely held reading of State Farm as a “triumph of
expertise to the exclusion of politics.”235 Rather, Department of Commerce
and Regents affirm that political influence is permissible in agency decisionmaking, because a court will ignore an agency’s political motivations for its
action—whether stated or unstated—when engaging in arbitrary and
capricious review.236 These decisions also suggest that “expertise”
inappropriately describes the kind of explanation needed to survive arbitrary
and capricious review because it implies a very high bar for agencies to meet.
The Court, however, does not require the agency to prove it adopted the best
course of action among alternatives or that it considered every possible
alternative.237 Instead, as applied by Chief Justice Roberts, State Farm
requires a showing that the agency’s action was the product of reasoned
decision-making—that the agency considered alternatives, weighed the pros
and cons of each, and explained why the selected course of action was
chosen. To hold, then, that an agency survived arbitrary and capricious
review under State Farm is to affirm that, irrespective of the role politics may
have played in the agency’s decision-making, the agency showed its work.
228. See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
229. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43, 52 (1983).
230. Murray, supra note 150, at 493, 500.
231. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
232. See Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2575.
233. See Metzger, supra note 128, at 29 & n.132.
234. See supra Part III.A.
235. Watts, supra note 31, at 19.
236. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
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As argued, Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look review comprises 0 percent
politics, regardless of the role politics played in the agency’s decisionmaking process. The next section shows that 100 percent of Chief Justice
Roberts’s hard look review involves the sufficiency of the reasoning process
and not the agency’s substantive policy decision.
B. Get with the Process
Chief Justice Roberts’s application of State Farm in Department of
Commerce and Regents firmly supports the prevailing position that hard look
review exclusively scrutinizes an agency’s reason-giving process.238 As
discussed above, the contradictory outcomes in these two cases turned on key
factual differences between Secretary Ross’s proffered explanation in
Department of Commerce and Secretary Duke’s in Regents.239 Secretary
Ross acknowledged major drawbacks of reinstating the citizenship question,
discussed the costs and benefits of alternative policies, and explained why—
despite the drawbacks and in comparison to alternatives—the citizenship
question still proved to be a reasonable course of action.240 In contrast,
Secretary Duke deferred to the attorney general’s recommendation to rescind
DACA in its entirety without considering whether an alternative,
forbearance-only program would solve DACA’s potential illegality while
preserving the reliance interests of its beneficiaries.241 Secretary Duke’s
reasoning process outlined in her memorandum failed to convince the Court
that DHS had considered all important aspects of the issue.242
Although Garland argues it would be incorrect to read State Farm as
identifying no wholly substantive component to hard look review,243 this
argument is less persuasive when applied to Department of Commerce and
Regents. Garland supports his position by gleaning from Justice White’s
opinion that NHTSA could not have proffered an explanation supporting full
rescission of Modified Standard 208 that would have satisfied the Court.244
This argument is inherently speculative because another explanation for
NHTSA’s rescission of Modified Standard 208 never came before the Court.
Garland, however, is not alone in reading State Farm as failing to clarify
whether NHTSA would have been permitted to reach the same result on
remand if it had provided a different explanation.245
Notably, this lack of clarity in State Farm is absent from Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinions in Department of Commerce and Regents. Unlike
238. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
239. See supra Part III.A.
240. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2570–71 (2019); see also supra
Parts I.C.1, III.A.
241. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1912–
13 (2020).
242. Id.; see also supra Parts I.C.2, III.A.
243. See Garland, supra note 162, at 545; see also supra notes 166–68 and accompanying
text.
244. See Garland, supra note 162, at 548–49, 549 n.247.
245. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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Justices White and Rehnquist, Chief Justice Roberts explicitly provided that
the decisions Secretary Ross and Secretary Duke attempted to implement
were substantively lawful as ultimate policy decisions and within their
delegated authority to implement.246 Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts
stated that Secretary Ross’s decision to reinstate the citizenship question was
not “substantively invalid,”247 and he acknowledged both that the law
broadly authorizes the secretary to structure the content of the Census and
that the Census historically inquired into citizenship.248 Chief Justice
Roberts similarly affirmed that Secretary Duke had the authority to rescind
DACA249 and that the Court was only to address DHS’s compliance “with
the procedural requirement that it provide a reasoned explanation for its
action.”250 In sum, Chief Justice Roberts clarified that Secretary Ross’s and
Secretary Duke’s actions were substantively permissible.
But he did not stop there. Chief Justice Roberts also drew a definitive line
concerning the Court’s responsibilities when reviewing an arbitrary and
capricious challenge, an issue that State Farm only quietly addressed.251 Per
Chief Justice Roberts, the question of whether the agency’s action actually
constitutes good policy is beyond the Court’s review.252 In Regents, Chief
Justice Roberts wrote that the Court does not resolve whether DACA or its
rescission are wise decisions, acknowledging that this determination is within
the secretary’s discretion.253 Similarly, in Department of Commerce, Chief
Justice Roberts stated that the Court’s role is not to ensure Secretary Ross
made the best possible decision and that if the Court were to second-guess
his decision, it would be impermissibly substituting its judgment for that of
the secretary.254 Thus, a more defined role for courts applying State Farm
emerges, one that promotes judicial restraint when reviewing agency actions.
Next, consider that Chief Justice Roberts’s resolution in both Department
of Commerce and Regents was to remand to the agency.255 Garland’s
framing of the distinction between process and substance proves particularly
useful here, supporting the conclusion that Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look
review is not substantive.256 As Justice Alito put it, by remanding, the Court
told the agency to “go back and try again.”257 According to Garland, implicit
in this resolution is that the agency can cure whatever defect the Court
identified and later adopt the same policy it initially intended.258 This, in
246. See infra text accompanying notes 247–50.
247. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019).
248. Id. at 2567–68.
249. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1905
(2020).
250. Id. at 1916.
251. See supra text accompanying note 72.
252. See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text.
253. See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1916.
254. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2571 (2019).
255. Id. at 2576; see also Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1916.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 168–72.
257. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1932 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
258. See Garland, supra note 162, at 570.
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turn, supports the view that hard look review is procedural. The issue with
Garland’s position, however, is that a reviewing court that believes an agency
can only cure its defect by adopting a different policy is also likely to resolve
via remand.259 Although Garland suggests that a court in this situation may
impose a particular outcome on the agency instead of remanding,260 State
Farm prohibits such action because a court may not substitute its judgment
for that of the agency.261
But, the argument that remand proves Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look
review is procedural is much more persuasive when contextualizing the
Court’s resolution with its acknowledgment that both Secretary Ross’s and
Secretary Duke’s substantive policy decisions were within their authority to
adopt. In Department of Commerce, Chief Justice Roberts’s remand and
emphasis on the substantive validity of reinstating the citizenship question
implies that Secretary Ross would satisfy the Court on remand by offering a
nonpretextual motivation for the change in policy.262 Similarly, the remand
in Regents with Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion that DHS had the authority
to rescind DACA suggests, as Justice Kavanaugh acknowledged, that
remanding would only delay DACA’s ultimate rescission because a fuller
explanation would survive judicial review.263
Thus, while remand insufficiently clarifies whether the Court was
scrutinizing the agencies’ reasoning processes or their substantive policy
decisions, Chief Justice Roberts explicitly removed the substantive validity
of the agencies’ policies from his analysis, showing that the defects in the
secretaries’ reasoning processes were curable on remand and that the Court’s
review was procedural.
The significant distinction drawn by Chief Justice Roberts in applying
State Farm is between substance and process. Whether to describe Chief
259. Id. at 572 (“[F]ew courts have expressly ordered affirmative relief to correct
substantive regulatory failures.”).
260. Id. at 570 (“[I]f . . . the court concludes that there is only one reasonable modification
or alternative, arguably the court should impose it.”).
261. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). While some Justices have criticized remand as being a pointless
formality that creates a game of “ping-pong” with the agency, remand actually protects agency
decision-making from judicial overreach. See, e.g., supra note 175 and accompanying text.
Per Chenery II, a reviewing court “may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action
that the agency itself has not given.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (citing Chenery II, 332 U.S.
194, 196 (1947)). By remanding to an agency, the court ensures that it does not replace its
own judgment for that of the agency.
262. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019) (“[T]he District Court
was warranted in remanding to the agency, and we affirm that disposition. We do not hold
that the agency decision here was substantively invalid.” (citation omitted)); see also Metzger,
supra note 128, at 29. Some find Chief Justice Roberts’s resolution in Department of
Commerce confusing because, by remanding after a finding of pretext, the Court seemed to
invite another pretextual rationale. See The Supreme Court, 2018 Term—Leading Cases, supra
note 125, at 380. This argument, however, overlooks that the remand can also be understood
as requiring Secretary Ross to proffer the true motivation for reinstatement.
263. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1935
(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Bronni, supra note
102.
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Justice Roberts’s review as procedural, as opposed to quasi-procedural,
provides little value here because the Chief Justice did not engage in this
analysis himself. Garland is correct to note that State Farm does not establish
a step-by-step process that agencies must follow to survive arbitrary and
capricious review.264 Garland also identifies seemingly substantive
components in hard look review because a court, in reviewing the sufficiency
of an agency’s explanation for acting, must thoroughly engage with the
agency’s reasoning process.265 This, however, does not make judicial review
pursuant to State Farm any less procedural. Chief Justice Roberts’s hard
look review is procedural because of what it does not evaluate: the wisdom
of the agency’s ultimate policy decision.
It is the agency, and not the reviewing court, that must engage in
substantive decision-making. The focus of judicial review pursuant to State
Farm, then, is not the agency’s substantive decision, but the thought process
that led to the agency’s substantive decision.266 By applying State Farm in
a way that only scrutinizes the agency’s reasoning process, Chief Justice
Roberts affirmed that the substance of an agency’s action is within the sole
discretion of that agency, and the Court’s role remains limited.
C. Putting the Issues Together: What Chief Justice Roberts’s Hard Look
Review Stands For
In sum, Chief Justice Roberts’s application of State Farm restrains the
Court’s role in reviewing agency actions. By excluding political influences
from the Court’s analysis while permitting their presence in agency decisionmaking, the Court avoids engaging with politics itself but does not hinder the
political branch’s ability to do so.267 By fixing the scope of its review on the
agency’s reasoning process and not its ultimate substantive policy decision,
the Court recognizes the danger in and seeks to avoid enforcing its own value
judgments instead of those of the agency.268
Chief Justice Roberts’s application of State Farm also holds agencies
accountable for their actions by affirming a strong commitment to the
reasoned decision-making requirement. By explicitly endorsing a role for
politics in agency decision-making,269 Chief Justice Roberts rejected the
method for ensuring accountability that President Wilson envisioned—
requiring agencies to be apolitical and expert driven.270 But, just because
agencies may consider political influences in their decision-making does not
mean State Farm permits a reviewing court to do so as well. Indeed, Chief
Justice Roberts also rejected a different way to increase accountability in
agency decision-making—by, as some have proposed,271 requiring a
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
See Garland, supra note 162, at 530.
See supra text accompanying notes 68–71.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
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reviewing court to show more deference to an agency when the president
contributed to the agency’s policy.272
In his application of State Farm, Chief Justice Roberts makes clear that the
mechanism for agency accountability is neither exclusive reliance on
apolitical expertise nor deference to the president’s agenda but the reasoned
decision-making requirement, a token of the interest group model of the
administrative state.273 By requiring agency decisions to be well reasoned
and honestly justified in light of the many different interests the decision may
affect, Chief Justice Roberts’s commitment to reasoned decision-making in
his application of State Farm holds agencies accountable for their decisions,
which may impact the lives of many.274
In contrast to Chief Justice Roberts’s application of State Farm, Justice
Breyer proposed that courts engaging in arbitrary and capricious judicial
review should consider “the nature and importance of the particular decision,
the relevance and importance of missing information, and the inadequacies
of a particular explanation in light of their importance.”275 This proposal
seemingly invites judges who disagree with an agency’s substantive policy
choice to deeply scrutinize it by stressing the importance of the agency’s
decision and conversely, to lighten up the scrutiny by downplaying a
decision’s importance when the policy aligns with the judge’s views. Thus,
Justice Breyer’s approach does little to solve one of the main criticisms of
State Farm—that it invites judges to vary their scrutiny of an agency’s
explanation according to their own political attitudes and ideologies.276 If
implemented, this critique would grow more forceful, as agencies may feel
that the outcome of an arbitrary and capricious challenge depends deeply on
which judge is assigned to hear the case, making judicial review all the more
unpredictable.
Most importantly, however, Justice Breyer’s proposal does not reaffirm
State Farm: it casts State Farm anew. The criticisms Chief Justice Roberts
received about his opinion being “lawless” ring truer, in fact, for Justice
Breyer’s opinion in Department of Commerce.277 Justice Breyer’s proposal
does not accord with precedent because State Farm never placed judges at
the center of arbitrary and capricious judicial review. Rather, State Farm
assigned judges a narrow role that prohibits them from replacing an agency’s
judgment with their own. State Farm empowered judges to evaluate the
agency’s proffered explanation and reasoning process to determine whether
the agency sufficiently justified and thought through its action in light of
alternatives.
272. See supra Part III.A.
273. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.
274. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019) (“The reasoned
explanation requirement of administrative law, after all, is meant to ensure that agencies offer
genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and
the interested public.”).
275. See id. at 2585 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276. See Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 17, at 354–55.
277. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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It is these aspects of State Farm that Chief Justice Roberts enunciated in
Department of Commerce and Regents. Perhaps muddled previously, Chief
Justice Roberts makes clear now that the agency and its reasons for acting sit
at the center of the Court’s review under State Farm. The president, the
president’s agenda, other political influences, and a judge’s beliefs as to what
the best policy would be are excluded from a court’s review. For Chief
Justice Roberts to hold otherwise would really be “convoluting the law” or
acting like a politician.278
Predicting how the Supreme Court will approach future arbitrary and
capricious challenges from a dataset of only two decisions is inherently
speculative—even more so given that the Court’s makeup has changed since
it decided Department of Commerce and Regents.279 Time will show
whether lower court judges and other Justices on the Court adopt the Chief
Justice’s hard look review.
But, what can be said with some surety is that unlike Chevron deference
and the intelligible principle doctrine—both of which have been under recent
attack by the current Justices—Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look review does
not raise the same separation of powers concerns.280 Rather, as applied in
Department of Commerce and Regents, Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look
review ensures a proper balance of power among the three branches: it
restrains the judiciary to protect the executive branch’s decision-making
authority but also maintains the judiciary’s significant function of review to
ensure the executive branch faithfully executes Congress’s laws.281 As such,
it is not only possible, but perhaps likely, that the Chief Justice and his hard
look review will continue to garner support from his colleagues on the bench
when the Court is faced with future arbitrary and capricious challenges.
CONCLUSION
State Farm has long been criticized as providing limited guidance to
judges and advocates on what is actually required for an agency to survive
an arbitrary and capricious challenge. Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look
review settles two of State Farm’s previously unresolved questions.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 8.
279. See Nicholas Fandos, Senate Confirms Barrett, Delivering for Trump and Reshaping
the Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/
us/politics/senate-confirms-barrett.html [https://perma.cc/UV4P-NUC8] (reporting on the
Senate’s confirmation of then Judge Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court to fill the
vacancy created by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s death).
280. See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, Opinion Analysis: Court Refuses to Resurrect Nondelegation
Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2019, 10:32 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2019/06/opinion-analysis-court-refuses-to-resurrect-nondelegation-doctrine
[https://perma.cc/P2A8-QTHZ] (explaining that “there are four justices on the Court willing
to reconsider the nondelegation doctrine from the ground up”); see also Daniel Hemel,
Argument Analysis: Hating on Chevron, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 7, 2018, 1:43 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-analysis-hating-on-chevron
[https://perma.cc/XL28-7TW8] (stating that Chevron has received criticism from Justice
Gorsuch, Justice Thomas, and Justice Kavanaugh).
281. See supra notes 267–73 and accompanying text.
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As displayed in Department of Commerce and Regents, an agency’s
decision will survive arbitrary and capricious review when, even if motivated
by politics, it was the product of reasoned decision-making. In other words,
Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look review requires a reviewing court to be
entirely unconcerned with political influence in agency decision-making,
regardless of the role politics actually played in the agency’s process.
Department of Commerce and Regents also show that hard look review is a
procedural tool to ensure agencies adequately discuss and justify their
actions, rather than a substantive analysis. It is the sufficiency of the
reasoning process and not the agency’s substantive policy decision that is the
linchpin of the Court’s review. In settling these two issues from State Farm,
Chief Justice Roberts both restrains the judiciary’s role in reviewing agency
actions and holds agencies accountable for their decisions, which impact the
lives of many, by affirming a strong commitment to the reasoned decisionmaking requirement.

